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STANDING UP TO WALL STREET 
(AND CONGRESS) 
Richard W. Painter* 
TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE 
AMERICA DON'T WANT You TO KNOW, WHAT You CAN Do TO 
FIGHT BACK. By Arthur Levitt. New York: Pantheon Books. 2002. Pp. 
x, 338. $24.95. 
In 1992, Arthur Levitt co-chaired a fundraising dinner for William 
Clinton. The dinner raised $750,000 (p. 7). Clinton was elected 
President, and Levitt got the job he wanted: Chairman of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. Levitt, a former Chairman of 
the American Stock Exchange and a connected Democrat, was well 
qualified for the job. His, however, became a pyrrhic victory when 
accountants, issuers, broker-dealers, and other special interests used 
their own political connections to frustrate just about everything he 
sought to do. 
Levitt tells the story of his struggle against these well-funded inter­
ests in Take on the Street. One of his most troubling revelations is how 
little independence the Commission, a purportedly independent 
agency,1 actually has in the face of political pressure from Congress. 
Combine that pressure with Congress's dependence on campaign 
contributions from industries regulated by the Commission and the 
recipe for regulatory capture is complete. 
Levitt is right that investors are not represented as an interest 
group on Capital Hill.2 Lack of investor representation, coupled with 
Congress's willingness to interfere with the work of the Commission, 
required Levitt to pick his battles carefully, and it is not always evident 
that he did so. Hindsight now provides Levitt with an opportunity to 
identify areas in which, despite the treacherous political waters of the 
1990s, he could have been more effective in protecting investors. 
Rarely, however, does the book reassess Levitt's own priorities or 
* Guy Raymond and Mildred van Voorhis Jones Professor of Law, University of 
Illinois. B.A 1984, Harvard; J.D. 1 987, Yale. - Ed. The author wishes to thank Peter 
Prommer for research assistance in connection with this Book Review. 
1. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2000) (including the Commission in the definition of "inde­
pendent regulatory agencies"). 
2. P. 237 (stating that investors are "the most overlooked and underrepresented interest 
group in America"). 
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approach. Instead, it concentrates on explaining why he pursued the 
regulatory agenda that he did. 
Levitt's emphasis on self-justification is one of the book's 
weaknesses. Nonetheless, he gives investors helpful advice in plain 
English on everything from mutual funds to stock brokers and reading 
financial statements, in separate chapters devoted to each of these 
topics. Perhaps most importantly, Levitt also explains how he was so 
often frustrated in doing his job. Although academic work on regula­
tory capture theory is abundant,3 a behind-the-scene account of how 
capture actually takes place is rare. An account as good as this one 
(complete with an Appendix publishing irate letters that Levitt 
received from members of Congress on behalf of the accounting 
industry) is a valuable contribution to the study of how regulatory 
agencies function in a political system influenced by the voice of 
regulated industries. 
TAKING ON THE AUDITORS 
In Chapter Five, Levitt discusses shortcomings he sees in the 
auditing profession. Chief among these are conflicts of interest when 
firms perform nonaudit services for audit clients. Levitt believes that 
nonaudit engagements, which sometimes generate fees several times 
higher than audit fees from the same clients, undermine auditors' 
independence from clients.4 Some of these engagements also involve 
work (such as bookkeeping) that will later be reviewed in the audit, 
posing another conflict of interest.5 
Levitt's view on these conflicts may be correct, although arguments 
in favor of nonaudit engagements are not explored, or adequately 
refuted, in his book. Audit firms are hardly independent to begin with, 
as audit fees are alone substantial and audit partners are often paid 
3. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A McCahery, Regulatory Competition, 
Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861 (1995). For gen­
eral discussion of the theory of regulatory capture, see George Stigler, The Theory of Eco­
nomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971), and Sam Peltzman, Toward a 
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976). 
4. P. 138 (citing Dow Jones Newswire report that companies making up the S&P 500 
paid their auditors $3.7 billion for nonaudit services in 2000, more than three times the $1 .2 
billion in audit fees paid by these same companies that year). In the case of some individual 
companies, the disparity between fees for audit and nonaudit services was much larger. 
Sprint Corp., for example, apparently paid Ernst & Young only $2.5 million for its audit and 
$64 million for consulting and other services. P. 138. "I have to wonder if any individual 
auditor, working on a $2.5 million audit contract, would have the guts to stand up to a CFO 
and question a dubious number in the books, thus possibly jeopardizing $64 million in busi­
ness for the firm's consultants." P. 138. 
5. "If an accountant keeps the books for a client, he can't turn around and vouch for the 
accuracy and completeness of those books." P. 118. 
1514 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:1512 
based on audit clients they bring in and keep.6 Issuers' managers 
in tum have substantial influence over hiring and firing auditors, 
particularly before Congress turned this function over to issuers' audit 
committees in 2002.7 Thus, the relevant inquiry is how much additional 
perverse incentive is created when fees from nonaudit services are 
added to the mix. The answer is not clear. Neither is it clear whether 
this added incentive for auditor malfeasance is outweighed by positive 
contributions to audit quality from having nonaudit services per­
formed for the issuer by the audit firm. 
Nonaudit engagements arguably could improve audit quality. First, 
there is informational ·advantage enjoyed by multidisciplinary audit 
firms. Providing nonaudit services, particularly legal and tax services, 
could help an audit firm see how a client puts together complex trans­
actions. Assuming the auditor has not erected a communication 
barrier or "firewall" between its audit and nonaudit functions, 
problems initially detected by nonauditors could be brought to the 
attention of auditors.8 The fact that auditors have broader disclosure 
obligations than other professionals, particularly lawyers, might 
increase the chances of public disclosure.9 
Second, the auditor providing nonaudit services could be held to a 
higher legal standard of care because it should know more about a 
client than an auditor that provides only audit services.10 Indeed, 
plaintiffs also could point to fees for nonaudit services as evidence of 
an additional motive for an auditor to misrepresent an issuer's finan­
cial statements.'' 
6. See Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeane Dugan, Sad Account: Andersen's Fall from Grace ls a 
Tale of Greed and Misrnes, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2002 at Al; Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting 
Firms Face Backlash over the Tax Shelters They Sold, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2003, at A6. 
7. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 202 (2002) (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending § lOA(m) of the Exchange Act to provide that 
audit committees shall be responsible for retention, compensation, and oversight of outside 
auditors); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78 (2000) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm) (2002)). 
8. See Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of 
Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1399, 1426-36 (2000) (discussing informational synergies 
from multidisciplinary practice that could improve audit quality). 
9. id. at 1430. 
10. The auditor thus might have more difficulty proving a due-diligence defense under § 
1 1  of the Securities Act or disproving a claim of recklessness under § lO(b) of the Exchange 
Act. 
1 1 .  Pleading specific facts that infer a defendant's motive to deceive is critical to surviv­
ing a motion to dismiss fraud claims under§ lO(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j 
(2000), and § 21 D(b) of the Exchange Act, 15  U.S.C. § 78u3 (requirement for pleading state 
of mind). See ln re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring 
"strong inference" of scienter through either (1) facts establishing a motive and opportunity 
to commit fraud; or (2) facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or con­
scious behavior). 
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Definitive resolution of the debate over nonaudit services thus 
requires answers to difficult questions that Levitt does not address: 
How much do nonaudit engagements increase the likelihood that 
auditors will cut corners to please lucrative clients, and are these per­
verse incentives outweighed by benefits to audit quality from nonaudit 
engagements?12 Levitt points out that many failed audits in recent 
years involved clients that obtained nonaudit services from their audi­
tors (pp. 138-39). His anecdotal evidence, however, comes from a rela­
tively small sample of less than a dozen firms. This hardly proves cause 
and effect. The case that nonaudit services are a serious threat to audit 
quality should be more rigorously tested by statistical comparison 
of audits by audit-only firms with audits by firms that also provide 
nonaudit services to the same issuer. A statistically significant 
difference in incidents of earnings restatements or other problems 
with audits between these two groups would provide firmer support 
for Levitt's intuitively appealing argument against allowing audit firms 
to provide nonaudit services for audit clientsY 
The Commission required issuers to publicly disclose nonaudit fees 
paid in proxy statements filed after February 5, 2001, and several em­
pirical studies use this newly public information to measure the impact 
of nonaudit fees on audit quality. Results of these studies, however, 
are inconclusive. One 2001 study found significant negative market 
reaction to proxy statements filed by issuers reporting higher than 
expected nonaudit fees, a measure perhaps of what the market thinks 
of audit quality.14 The study also found some evidence that issuers that 
12. In addition to the ways in which nonaudit services could improve audit quality, there 
arguably are economies of scale and synergies that could be realized when issuers obtain 
audit and nonaudit services from one provider. For example, time spent by both auditors 
and nonaudit service providers familiarizing themselves with a client's business and 
management could be reduced when audits and other services are provided by the same 
firm. To the extent such cost savings are passed on to investors, they too are relevant to the 
question of whether auditor provision of nonaudit services helps or harms investors. 
13. This author is aware of only one such study that looks for a correlation between 
earnings restatements and nonaudit services. This is also the only study that this author is 
aware of that examines "confidential" data from the time period prior to 2000 (data 
concerning nonaudit fees for the period after 2000 is publicly available). See William R. Kin­
ney, Jr. et al., Auditor Independence and Non-audit services: What do Restatements Sug­
gest? (May 14, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (using detailed fee data 
- obtained by the study's authors after negotiating a confidentiality agreement with the 
seven largest auditing firms in the United States - on 432 registrants that announced re­
statements from 1995-2000 and 512 similar registrants without restatements). This study 
found little evidence of positive association between issuer restatements and audit-firm fees 
for either financial-information systems or internal-audit services. However, the study found 
some evidence of positive correlation between "other" services fees and restatements, ex­
cept for a negative correlation between tax services and restatements. By contrast, most em­
pirical studies in this area look for a correlation between nonaudit services and an indicator 
of audit quality other than restatements. See studies cited infra notes 14-17. 
14. RICHARD M. FRANKEL ET AL., AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AND EARNINGS 
QUALITY (Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1696R, July 2001). 
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bought more nonaudit services from their auditors were more likely 
to engage in earnings management, a practice which is difficult to 
measure but that can be approximated by examining how often an 
issuer just meets or beats earnings benchmarks or reports large 
income-increasing or income-decreasing discretionary accruals.15 
Other studies, however, show no effect of nonaudit fees on other 
measures of audit quality, such as the willingness of the auditor to 
send a "going concern" opinion letter to an issuer that questions the 
issuer's ability to stay in business.16 Absent more empirical evidence 
confirming Levitt's concern about nonaudit fees, it is not at all certain 
that his enormous battle with the accounting industry over this issue 
was a worthwhile expenditure of political capital (p. 138). 
Furthermore, Levitt does not discuss other approaches that might 
be more effective in improving audit quality. For example, the SEC 
could have allowed auditors to provide nonaudit services to audit 
clients, but only on the condition that (i) auditors communicate on a 
regular basis with employees performing nonaudit services for the 
same client; (ii) all information known to nonaudit employees in the 
audit firm be imputed to the auditors for purposes of civil and criminal 
liability; (iii) the audit firm rotates the audit partner with principal 
responsibility for each client's account;17 and (iv) perhaps most impor-
1 5. Id. But see Hollis Ashbaugh et al., Do Non-Audit Services Compromise Auditor 
Independence? Further Evidence (Apr. 18, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) (finding no such correlation between issuers' positive discretionary accruals and the 
ratio of audit to nonaudit fees in a study that controlled for the issuers' prior performance, a 
factor that can itself be related to income increasing accruals); J. Kenneth Reynolds et al., 
Professional Service Fees and Auditor Objectivity (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author) (observing that the correlation between aggregate levels of discretionary accru­
als and the ratio of consulting fees to audit fees disappears when controlling for high-growth 
issuers). Other studies also have not detected a relationship between audit firms' fees and 
evidence of earnings management. See, e.g., Hyeesoo Chung & Sanjay Kallapur, Client 
Importance, Non-Audit Services, and Abnormal Accruals (Aug. 2002) (unpublished manu­
script, on file with author) (finding no statistically significant association between abnormal 
accruals by issuers and "client importance" measures such as the ratio of both audit and 
nonaudit fees to the audit firm's total U.S. revenues or to the revenues of a particular office 
of the audit firm). 
1 6. See, e.g., Mark L. Defond et al., Do Non-Audit Service Fees Impair Auditor 
Independence? Evidence from Going Concern Audit Opinions, 40 J. ACCT. RES . 1243 (2002) 
(finding no significant correlation between the auditor's willingness to issue a going concern 
opinion with respect to an issuer and either total fees or audit fees paid by the issuer to its 
audit firm). The results of this study could be harmonized with those of FRANKEL ET AL., 
supra note 14, by hypothesizing that auditors are induced by nonaudit fees to cut small cor­
ners for issuers, as shown by earnings management strategies, but that nonaudit fees will not 
discourage an auditor from acting appropriately to address a serious problem, such as issuer 
insolvency, in which the auditor's own liability is significantly enhanced. 
17. This condition is now imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 203, amending 
§ lOA of the Exchange Act. The Act also orders a study to be conducted as to whether audit 
firm rotation should also be required. See § 207. At least one empirical study, however, has 
found that the size of an issuer's earnings accruals is inversely related to the length of the 
auditor-client relationship. This would suggest that mandatory auditor rotation could actu­
ally harm audit quality. See James Myers et al., Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client 
May 2003) Standing Up to Wall Street (and Congress) 1517 
tant, that the audit committee of an issuer rather than the issuer's 
senior management be responsible for hiring and firing the auditor.18 
Such approaches might have increased the likelihood that information 
gained from nonaudit services actually informed the audit. 
Whatever the merits of his position on nonaudit engagements, 
Levitt is right that the way in which the accountants fought their battle 
with the Commission over this issue raises questions about the 
Commission's ability to preserve its own independence from the 
industries it regulates. The barrage of letters that Levitt received from 
Members of Congress urging him to back off on auditor independence 
(and the similar letter from Kenneth Lay, the CEO of Enron, praising 
nonaudit and audit services performed by Arthur Andersen)19 is 
deeply troubling. Here, in the Appendix to Levitt's book, one sees the 
power of Congress being brought to bear on a purportedly independ­
ent agency, as well as Congress's eagerness to respond to demands 
that regulated industries make on the political process.20 
TAKING ON THE ANALYSTS 
Conflicts of interest affecting stock market research were obvious 
by the time Levitt became Chairman of the Commission in 1993.21 
After fixed commissions were abolished in 1975 and the profitability 
of brokerage operations declined, broker-dealers earned lower returns 
on reputational capital tied to research and recommendations in 
stocks.22 The enormous profitability of underwriting and trading 
operations in the 1990s, on the other hand, encouraged broker-dealers 
to sacrifice their reputation on the research side if necessary to attract 
investment banking business and to favor their own traders over bro­
kerage customers. In some instances, this is exactly what happened.23 
Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation? (June 
2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
1 8 .  This condition is also now imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 201, 
amending § lOA of the Exchange Act. 
19. See Appendix at 299-300 (letter dated September 20, 2000 from Kenneth L. Lay, 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Enron Corporation to Arthur Levitt, Chairman, 
Securities Exchange Commission (stating that "for the past several years, Enron has success­
fully utilized its independent audit firm's expertise and professional skepticism to help im­
prove the overall control environment within the company")). 
20. These aspects of the capture problem are discussed more extensively under the 
heading "Taking on Congress" in this Review. 
21. "The problem was apparent as far back as the 1960s." P. 69. 
22. "During the past two decades, the economics of Wall Street had shifted away from 
retail sales to arranging initial public offerings, which brought in billions of dollars of profit 
during the runaway bull market." P. 65. 
23. See p. 66. 
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During the bull market of the 1990s, analysts' buy recommenda­
tions not surprisingly outnumbered sell recommendations by huge 
proportions.24 Investment-banking clients were almost never down­
graded, even if the firm's trading desk knew, perhaps from confiden­
tial emails from analysts, that the stock was to be avoided.25 Industry 
relationships reinforced this behavior because issuers had substantial 
influence over their investment bankers, who they could always 
replace with a competitor, and investment bankers in turn had sub­
stantial influence over the work of analysts in their firms, even how 
much analysts got paid. 
Rather than addressing these structural problems that encouraged 
analysts to mislead investors, however, the Commission focused most 
of its efforts on a related problem: analysts' informational advantage 
over ordinary investors from private communications with issuers. The 
Commission sought in Regulation Fair Disclosure ("Regulation 
FD")26 to prevent analysts from receiving preferential access to 
nonpublic information from issuers, and thus to prevent analysts' firms 
from trading on that information or allowing favored customers to 
trade on that information, before it is disseminated to the public.27 
Such access to inside information creates yet one more incentive for 
analysts to shade their reports in order to preserve their relationship 
with issuer management.28 Removing analysts' informational advan­
tage, however, does not remove other incentives (such as investment­
banking business) that analysts and their firms have to shade reports 
to please issuer management. Regulation FD was thus only a partial 
answer to misleading analysts' recommendations. 
It was with Regulation FD that the Commission, despite its well 
intentioned effort to even the playing field between analysts and ordi­
nary investors, may have had the wrong priorities. Analysts' privileged 
access to inside information was a problem. A still greater problem, 
however, was that information given to investors by some analysts, 
even absent inside information, was wrong, and probably intentionally 
so. It was the misinformation given by analysts to investors that fed 
the market bubble of the late 1990s, not the fact that investors did not 
24. See p. 73 (reporting that in March 2000, there were ninety-two buy recommenda­
tions for every sell recommendation). 
25. P. 65 (discussing investigation in which New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer 
subpoenaed internal emails from analysts at Merrill Lynch that had described stock recom­
mended by these analysts as "a piece of junk," "crap," and "a dog"). 
26. 1 7  C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103 (2001). 
27. "Mutual funds and pension funds were getting far better information, and a lot 
earlier, than retail investors." P. 8. 
28. Some issuer CEO's and finance chiefs "were trading important information about 
earnings and product development· with selected analysts, who in return were writing 
glowing reports." P. 8 
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get information soon enough. Combating this misinformation should 
have been the Commission's priority. 
There is also at least some evidence that Regulation FD delays 
rather than accelerates dissemination of information to markets by 
encouraging issuers to delay communication with analysts until they 
are willing to make a public announcement.29 Regulation FD, on the 
other hand, seems fair because it requires issuers to let their own 
shareholders know information at the same time they tell analysts. 
Because fairness is important to investor confidence, Regulation FD 
may have been justified despite its costs. Nonetheless, the 
Commission, in pushing this controversial Rule, spent political capital 
that could have been spent addressing structural problems that 
induced some analysts to lie to investors in research reports even when 
they did not possess material nonpublic information about an issuer. 
Although Levitt sought to address these structural problems by 
pressuring the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") 
to strengthen ethics rules for analysts, he did so late in the his term, 
after the market bubble had already begun to burst.30 The SEC talked 
about the possibility of regulating analysts if the NASD would not,31 
but the SEC did not propose rules of its own. Not until passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did federal regulation address analysts' 
conflicts of interest.32 Moreover, the SEC never required brokerage 
firms to disclose this problem to ordinary investors, for example, by 
disclosing that analysts' reports are "sales literature,"33 something that 
29. See, e.g., Richard M. Frankel et al., An Empirical Investigation of Pre-Earnings An­
nouncement Quiet Periods (Feb. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (ob­
serving a substantial increase in the number of issuer self-imposed "quiet periods" after 
Regulation FD; that quiet-period issuers have characteristics indicative of higher litigation 
risk; and that trading volume in these issuers' stocks is higher before earnings 
announcements, but lower afterwards). 
30. P. 67 (describing December 2000 phone call from NASD President Mary Schapiro 
informing Levitt that the NASD's members could not agree on a new code of conduct for 
securities analysts that Levitt had fourteen months earlier asked the NASD to come up 
with). 
3 1 .  P. 67 (reporting that Levitt, in the December 2000 phone call with Schapiro, insisted 
that the NASD regulate and threatened, "If you don't do it, we will."). 
32. Section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 added § 15D of the Exchange Act, 
which requires the Commission to promulgate rules designed to address conflicts of interest 
in securities analysts' reports within one year of the Act's passage. These rules must, among 
other things, restrict the involvement of investment-banking employees of the 
broker-dealer in approval of research reports, 'supervising or compensating analysts, as well 
as prohibit the broker-dealer from retaliating against an analyst as a result of recommenda­
tions. See 15 U.S.C. § 15D(a). The Commission is also required to promulgate rules requir­
ing securities analysts to disclose in public appearances and in research reports their own 
conflicts of interest. See § 15D(b ) .  
33.  See Robert P.  Sieland, Note, Caveat Emptor! After All the Regulatory Hoopla, Secu­
rities Analysts Remain Conflicted on Wall Street, �003 U. ILL. L. REV. 531 (recognizing that 
conflicts of interest persist for securities analysts even after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
proposing that all analysts' reports generated within broker-dealers be labeled "sales litera­
ture" to alert investors to these conflicts). 
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sophisticated investors already knew.34 In hindsight, the Commission 
should have directed the same energy that it spent battling broke�­
dealers over Regulation FD toward an initiative early in Levitt's term 
to curtail the misleadingly optimistic analysts' reports that Levitt knew 
all along were a factor in the market's unrealistic valuation of equities 
in the 1990s (p. 71). 
TAKI NG ON THE LA WYERS 
Levitt's book also omits an important issue in the debate over the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: corporate lawyers who knowingly assist 
clients with defrauding investors or at a minimum look the other way 
when clients commit fraud.35 The last time the Commission sought to 
define standards of professional responsibility for securities lawyers 
through disciplinary proceedings was in 1981 .36 The Commission soon 
thereafter made a point of reassuring lawyers that it would not again 
seek to impose sanctions on lawyers absent judicial or bar association 
findings of violations.37 The Commission under Levitt continued what 
it had been doing about securities lawyers' ethics since the early 1980s: 
nothing. 
A few commentators urged Levitt's Commission to clarify its 
stance on lawyer disclosure of corporate fraud, asking for an imposi­
tion of an up-the-ladder reporting requirement requiring lawyers to 
communicate with client boards of directors about securities law viola­
tions.38 The Commission, however, continued to stay away from 
lawyers. Finally, after the Enron and Worldcom fiascoes, forty law 
professors wrote Levitt's successor Harvey Pitt in March 2002 seeking 
34. Pp. 74-77 (subchapter titled "Everybody Knew- Except You"). 
35. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 307 and legislative history of § 307 discussed in text ac­
companying notes 38-41, infra. 
36. See In re William R. Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17597, 22 SEC Docket 
No. 292 (Feb. 28, 1981), 1981 WL 384414. 
37. See Edward F. Greene, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Remarks to the New York County Lawyers' Association, January. 
18, 1982, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. ·Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), '![ 83,089 (Jan. 18, 1982) 
(statement by SEC General Counsel Greene that in his view the SEC should not institute 
proceedings against lawyers under Rule 102(e), absent a prior judicial finding of a 
securities law violation); Securities Act Release No. 6783, 1988 WL 278442, at 24631 (July 
13, 1988) (reaffirming that Rule 102(e) charges should not be brought absent prior determi­
nation by a court or bar association that the attorney's conduct was unethical or a violation 
of securities laws). 
38. See Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate 
Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225 (1996) [hereinafter Painter & 
Duggan, Corporate Fraud] (proposing SEC rules, or alternatively an amendment to the Ex­
change Act, requiring up-the-ladder reporting by issuer's counsel either to the issuer's full 
board of directors or to a committee of the issuer's board designated by the issuer in ad­
vance); see also Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 719 
(2001). 
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a Commission rule requiring issuers' lawyers to report unrectified se­
curities law violations to client boards of directors.39 The Commission 
responded by acknowledging strong opposition from within the 
organized bar to Commission regulation of lawyers and by suggesting 
that Congress could step into this arena if it wanted.4° Congress took 
up this invitation in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and mandated 
that the Commission promulgate professional responsibility rules for 
lawyers representing issuers before the Commission, including the up­
the-ladder reporting requirement.41 The Commission promulgated its 
rules in January 2003,42 but even these rules were watered down from 
the Commission's November 2002 proposals that had drawn the pre­
dictable ire of lawyers subject to those rules.43 
Although these legislative and rulemaking initiatives began after 
publication of Levitt's book, lawyers' professional responsibility 
was an important issue before and during Levitt's tenure at the 
Commission.44 The Commission's role in regulating securities lawyers, 
however, goes unmentioned in his book. The Commission's failure for 
over two decades to assure the integrity of the lawyers who practice 
before it was an example of how, even without interference from 
Congress, the Commission could quickly back down in the face of 
pressure from an interest group that it had, briefly in the late 1970s, 
sought to regulate. Indeed, in this instance it was Congress, in the sea 
change of political opinion after the Enron and Worldcom scandals, 
that stood up to the ABA and other bar associations and told the 
Commission that lawyer regulation was required. 
As Chairman of the Commission, however, Levitt did address 
lawyers' ethics in one important area (also not mentioned in his book): 
"pay to play" arrangements in which municipal bond lawyers or 
39. Letter from Richard W. Painter et al., to Harvey Pitt, Chairman, Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Mar. 7, 2002) (on file with author). 
40. Letter from David M. Becker, General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion, to Richard W. Painter (Mar. 28, 2002) (on file with author) (citing Painter & Duggan, 
Corporate Fraud, supra note 38, for the proposition that Congress rather than the Commis­
sion should take the first step toward federal regulation of securities lawyers). 
41. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act,§ 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002). 
42. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205, 240 and 249, adopted in Release No. 33-8185; 34-47276. For the 
Commission's proposed Rules, see Release No. 33-8186; 34-47282, available at http://www. 
sec.gov, proposing 17 C.F.R Parts 205, 240 and 249. 
43. See http://www.sec.gov (containing several dozen comment letters from around the 
world, mostly from securities lawyers and bar associations, on the Commission's proposed 
rules under§ 307). The Commission in its final rules responded to these comment letters by 
narrowing many of the definitions in the proposed rules. The Commission, for example, 
more narrowly defined which lawyers "practice before the Commission" and are thereby 
covered by the rules, and the definition of what constitutes "evidence of a material viola­
tion" sufficient to trigger lawyer reporting obligations. 
44. See Painter & Duggan, Corporate Fraud, supra note 38; Jn re William R. Carter, Ex­
change Act Release No. 34-17597, 22 SEC Docket No. 292 (Feb. 28, 1981), 1981 WL 384414. 
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plaintiffs' lawyers make campaign contributions to state officials and 
are then appointed as counsel for state bond underwritings or for state 
pension funds having the lead plaintiffs' role in securities class action 
suits.45 The Commission should perhaps have followed through by 
discouraging municipal-bond issuers from retaining bond counsel that 
made campaign contributions, and by filing amicus briefs in class 
actions asking courts to disqualify counsel who had made campaign 
contributions to state officials who manage the pension funds serving 
as lead plaintiff. The ABA, however, fought the SEC on this issue, 
and, unfortunately, the SEC did not stand its ground.46 The ABA was 
allowed to substitute its own rule that is highly subjective and 
unenforceable.47 
TAKING ON MANAGEMENT 
Accountants, broker-dealers, lawyers, and other gatekeepers could 
have done more to prevent financial fraud during the 1990s, but 
managers at issuer corporations were usually the primary culprits. 
Compensation tied to stock price may have given managers more in­
centives to commit fraud, and directors may have provided inadequate 
oversight of managers' activities. Although state corporation law, not 
federal securities law, governs compensation of managers and govern­
ance of corporations, it would be interesting to hear Levitt's view of 
whether state corporate law failed, and if so, what should be done 
about it. 
One of Levitt's predecessors as Chairman of the Commission, 
William Cary, believed strongly that state corporate law in the 1960s 
and 1970s was racing to the bottom from investors' vantage point, and 
Cary initiated an important academic debate with his proposal for 
federalization of corporate law.48 Levitt could have revived this debate 
by specifically pointing out which areas of corporate law, if any, he 
45. See Arthur Levitt, Lawyers and Ethics: The Problem of Pay-to-Play, Remarks at the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Fixed Income Daily Conference on Municipal 
Finance (June 26, 1 997), available at 1997 WL 353221 (S.E.C.); Michael Stanton, Levitt Says 
SEC May Act if Lawyers, Issuers Don't Curb Pay to Play, BOND BUYER, Apr. 18, 1996, at 3. 
46. See generally Jon B. Jordan, The Regulation of "Pay-to-Play" and the Influence of 
Political Contributions in the Municipal Securities Industry, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 489 
(describing Levitt's confrontation with the ABA and other bar associations over this issue). 
47. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.6 (2003) (providing that "[a] lawyer or 
law firm shall not accept a government legal engagement or an appointment by a judge if 
the lawyer or law firm makes a political contribution or solicits political contributions for 
the purpose of obtaining or being considered for that type of legal engagement or 
appointment"). 
48. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974). But see Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, 
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (arguing that Delaware 
corporate law maximizes rather than minimizes shareholder welfare). 
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believed should be subject to federal regulation. For the most part, 
Levitt does not engage this topic, even though as his book was going 
to press, Congress was enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the 
broadest federal encroachment into corporate governance in decades. 
One very significant issue is management compensation. Stock 
options and other compensation packages that tie managers' pay to 
stock prices gave managers more incentive than they already had to 
conceal earnings shortfalls and other problems in order to temporarily 
inflate issuer stock prices. Nonetheless, stock options and manager 
compensation were for the most part untouched by the Sarbanes­
Oxley Act.49 Levitt points out instances where shareholders object 
because too many stock options are granted or options are exercisable 
at ridiculously low' prices (pp. 212-13, 218-19), and the Commission is 
now deliberating over proposals from the stock exchanges that would 
require shareholder approval of employee stock options.50 Meanwhile, 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board is still deliberating over 
whether issuers should be required to treat stock options as an 
expense at the time they are granted,51 an issue about which the 
Commission did little during Levitt's tenure.52 
Implicit in these debates is the assumption that issuers should grant 
their executives stock options in the first place. Perhaps options are 
desirable because the incentive they give managers to enhance corpo­
rate performance outweighs the incentive options give managers to 
overcompensate themselves and to lie about performance. While this 
may be true, it is not obvious. Readers would have benefited from 
hearing Levitt's view on whether options should be used at all, and 
whether the Commission, the stock exchanges, state corporate law, or 
issuers themselves should decide when options are to be granted, and 
how they are to be accounted for. 
By contrast, the oversight functions of corporate boards, and 
particularly audit committees, are extensively regulated in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.53 It is here that the Act intrudes most broadly 
49. The Act does, however, provide that an issuer's chief executive officer and chief fi­
nancial officer must forfeit bonuses and profits from trades in securities of the issuer during 
periods in which the issuer is required to restate its earnings "as a result of misconduct." 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act§ 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2002). 
50. Gretchen Morgenson, Plan Restricting Stock Options Stalls at S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 13, 2003, at Al. 
51. See, Arden Dale, Accounting Body to Consider Classification of Stock Options, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2003, at C9 (reporting that the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
voted to add to its agenda the issue of whether to require companies to count employee 
stock options as a compensation expense). 
52. See pp. 107-11 (discussing Levitt's caving in to pressure from Congress and refusing 
to back up FASB on its proposed rule that would require issuers to account for options as an 
expense when granted). 
53. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, amending § lOA of the Exchange Act, to add 
subsection (m) requiring the Commission to direct the national securities exchanges to pro-
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into matters traditionally governed under state corporate law, 
triggering debate over whether this intrusion was really necessary,54 
and if so, whether it went far enough. Levitt discusses corporate audit 
committees' lack of independence in Chapter Eight of his book, as 
well as his own partially successful effort as Chairman to persuade the 
stock exchanges to reform audit committees.55 Such initiatives, 
however, pale in comparison to the sweeping regulation in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and it would be helpful to know if Levitt believes 
federal legislation of corporate governance was required, or whether 
his more conservative approach of working through the stock 
exchanges ultimately would have been successful. 
TAKING ON THE LITIGATION SYSTEM 
Although the Commission has long viewed private rights of action 
as a necessary supplement to its own enforcement powers, Levitt led a 
lukewarm effort to fight retrenchment of private plaintiffs' rights in 
two rounds of amendments to the securities laws in 1995 and 1998. 
Levitt's book barely mentions this important legislation, thus side­
stepping a major issue in the debate over investor protection in the 
1990s. 
Even if Levitt had taken a more aggressive stance against legisla­
tive retrenchment of civil litigation, his task would have been made 
difficult by Congress's hostility to plaintiffs and the poor public image 
of the plaintiffs' bar. One prominent class action lawyer publicly stated 
that he "has no clients,"56 reinforcing defendants' arguments that class 
action litigation enriched lawyers more than it protected investors. 
Plaintiffs' lawyers contributed to their political allies, mostly 
Democrats, but could not match the political contributions of defen­
dants who carefully nurtured relationships in both parties. Plaintiffs' 
hibit listing of securities of any issuer that does not meet requirements specified in that sub­
section (m) concerning membership on directors' audit committees, duties of audit 
committees, and audit committee procedures for, among other things, receiving anonymous 
information from employees of the issuer and engaging independent counsel. 
54. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the 
Rent on U.S. Law, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act went too far, particularly in its interference with corporate governance norms that tradi­
tionally vary depending on the state or country of incorporation); Larry E. Ribstein, Market 
vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2003). 
55. See pp. 204-35 (chapter entitled "Corporate Governance and the Culture of 
Seduction" discussing shortcomings in corporate governance and more specifically of the 
SEC's efforts to integrate audit committee reform into stock exchange listing requirements). 
56. William P. Barrett, I Have No Clients, FORBES, Oct. 1 1 ,  1993, at 52 (quoting William 
S. Lerach (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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lawyers thus lost their legislative battles in 1995 and 1998, and the 
debate continues over whether investors lost as well.57 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") 
changed private securities litigation more than any statute since the 
1930s. The 1995 Act imposed new procedural hurdles, including 
heightened pleading standards and a stay on discovery pending resolu­
tion of a defendant's motion to dismiss. The 1995 Act also included a 
"safe harbor" against fraud claims for forward-looking statements, as 
well as new, pro-defendant formulas for calculating damages. Defen­
dants other than the issuers (such as auditors) in most cases were 
made only liable for a portion of the shareholders' damages according 
to a proportionate-liability formula linked to a defendant's share of 
blame for the violation.58 The combined effect of all of these provi­
sions was to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to win securities fraud 
suits and, when plaintiffs do win, to reduce liability. Whatever the 
merits of this legislation, particularly in cutting back on frivolous suits, 
it may have reduced the deterrent effect of civil litigation by reducing 
the expected cost of violating securities laws. 
In retrospect, someone needed to speak out on Capitol Hill, not 
for defendants or for plaintiffs' lawyers, but for investors. Levitt tried 
to do so,59 and the Commission micromanaged some important 
compromises concerning the wording of the 1995 Act.60 The Commis­
sion did not, however, propose a clear alternative agenda that priori­
tized investors over lawyers and defendants. For example, the 
57. Many scholars believed that the 1995 Reform Act made litigation on behalf of 
plaintiffs too difficult. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. L. 975, 995 (1996) 
(the 1995 Reform Act favors defendants "at virtually every juncture."); Joel Seligman, The 
Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1996); Lynn A. Stout, Type I 
Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 
(1996). Others were concerned that the PSLRA had not gone far enough, and that litigation 
was merely shifting to state courts. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The 
Pentium Papers: A Case Study of Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (1996). 
58. These provisions are incorporated in Securities Act § 27 (Private Securities 
Litigation) and§ 27 A (Application of Safe Harbor for Forward Looking Statements), and in 
Exchange Act, § 21D (Private Securities Litigation) and § 21 E (Application of Safe Harbor 
for Forward Looking Statements). 
59. P. 13 ("The vast and growing number of individual investors, however, lacked focus, 
direction, or leadership to make much of an impression on Washington policy makers. I 
often wondered how to empower this expanding group . . . .  ") .  
60. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform Proposals: Hearings on S. 240, S. 667, and H.R. 
1058 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 247, 249 (1995) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman. U.S 
Securities and Exchange Commission) (expressing Levitt's concern that the Senate Bill 
contained language setting forth a pleading standard that was too high, and that the Act 
failed to define the standard of recklessness sufficient to sustain an action under § lO(b) of 
the Exchange Act); Id. at 231, 235-36 (stating that Chairman Levitt favored the 
Second Circuit's pleading standard for scienter). The Commission was also very much 
involved with Congress's drafting of the Act's safe harbor for forward looking statements. 
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Commission could have strongly endorsed reforms that curtailed pro­
cedural and ethical abuses by plaintiffs' lawyers without curtailing 
substantive rights of plaintiffs themselves. The F.R.C.P. Rule 11 provi­
sions of the 1995 Act its limitations on excessive counsel fees, its 
settlement disclosure requirements, and its lead counsel provisions -
all should have received strong Commission support at th.e outset.61 
Changes to pleading, discovery, and damages formulas, including 
the Act's proportionate liability scheme, were more problematic in 
that they directly obstructed plaintiffs' remedies and thus decreased 
the expected penalty for fraud.62 Arguably, the proportionate liability 
scheme encouraged auditors and other collateral participants to worry 
less about fraud liability, with adverse consequences in Enron and 
other matters.63 Also, perhaps the <;::ommission should have insisted 
that it, not Congress and the various lobbyists influencing Congress, 
design the safe harbor for .forward looking statements. Finally, 
although the Commission was given some additional enforcement 
powers in the 1995 Act,64 the Commission should have insisted on 
more extensive enforcement powers and a more adequate budget, in 
return for Commission endorsement of the 1995 Act. 
The Commission instead appears to have spent much of its energy 
reacting to initiatives in Congress. With nobody making a clear case 
that investor protection is different from lawyer protection, the battle 
over the 1995 Act was easy to portray as one between plaintiffs' 
lawyers and defendants,65 neither of whom could claim the moral high 
61. Other provisions of the 1995 Act targeted at abuses by plaintiffs' lawyers include 
those barring the use of repeat "professional plaintiffs"; barring lawyers from giving finan­
cial incentives to lead plaintiffs; prohibiting sealed settlements that conceal attorneys' fees 
and other information about a settlement; and barring attorneys from receiving a dispropor­
tionate share of settlement awards. It can always be argued that measures designed to curb 
plaintiffs' lawyers ultimately hurt plaintiffs by discouraging lawyers from filing suits. Perhaps 
at the margins this is true, but regulation of lawyer conduct generally deters the least merito­
rious suits and encourages lawyers to share a more significant percentage of damage awards 
with investors. Compared with measures that directly impair plaintiffs' procedural and 
substantive legal rights, regulation of lawyer conduct should cure abuses in class action litiga­
tion at lower cost to investors. 
62. See Securities Act§ 27 and Exchange Act§ 21 D (containing these provisions). 
63. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "Its About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 
57 Bus. L. 1403, 1410 (2002) (stating that "the new standard of proportionate liability pro­
tected (auditors] far more than it did most corporate defendants" and that "although audi­
tors are still sued today, the settlement value of cases against auditors has gone way down"). 
On the other hand, Arthur Andersen's fate should send a powerful message to the account­
ing industry that proportionate liability will not save an auditor from collapse, particularly in 
cases that involve large investor losses and potential criminal conduct. 
64. The most significant of these was the Commission's power to bring actions against 
aiders and abettors. See Exchange Act § 20, added by § 104 of the 1995 Act. The Supreme 
Court a few years earlier had held that private plaintiffs could not sue aiders and abettors 
under§ lO(b) of the Exchange Act. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 
U.S. 164 (1994). 
65. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (stating that before enactment of the 
1995 Act, Congress heard testimony concerning various abuses by the plaintiff's bar). 
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ground. Even the President's veto message, which emphasized his 
objections to the Act's mandatory Rule 11 provisions,66 showed where 
his loyalties lay, giving the Act's proponents yet another argument for 
an override.67 Little was done to compensate for the potential decrease 
in private enforcement by broadening Commission powers, and 
nothing was done to adequately fund the Commission's enforcement 
budget. 
In 1998, plaintiffs lost another battle, this time over preemption of 
class actions for securities fraud under state law. Congress had specifi­
cally preserved state private rights of action when it enacted the 
Exchange Act in 1934.68 Moreover, Congress did not create express 
private rights of action for securities fraud that it might have created 
had it chosen instead to preempt state law. Federal courts subse­
quently implied a private right of action under section lO(b) of the 
Exchange Act, but the Supreme Court has been hostile to it.69 The one 
check on excessively pro-defendant federal case law under section 
lO(b ), or on further statutory restrictions on plaintiffs similar to those 
in the 1995 Act, was availability of class actions in state courts under 
state law. 
Defendants argued, however, that plaintiffs' lawyers were using 
state litigation as an end-run around the · 1995 Act.70 Among other 
abuses, state litigation was purportedly being used to obtain discovery 
that was stayed pending resolution of a defendants' motion to dismiss 
66. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 - Veto Message from the 
President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 104-150 (1995) (stating that "Specifically, I 
object to the following elements of this bill . . .  Third, restore the Rule 1 1  language to that of 
the Senate bill."), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. Hl5,214-06 (1995). FRCP Rule 1 1 ,  among 
other things, allows sanctions against lawyers for frivolous pleadings. The 1995 Act makes 
these sanctions mandatory in securities cases. See Securities Act § 27 and Exchange Act § 
210. 
67. On December 20, 1995, the House voted to override the veto by a vote of 319-100, 
and on December 22 the Senate voted to override the veto by a vote of 68-30. 141 CONG. 
REC. H15,223 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S19180 (1995). 
68. See § 16 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1996) ("The rights and remedies pro­
vided by this Act shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist 
at law or in equity.");§ 28(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1996) ("The rights 
and reinedies provided by this title shall be in addition to any and all other rights and reme­
dies that may exist at law or in equity."). 
69. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) ("[W)e are satisfied that 
Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy 
for all fraud."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738, n:9 (1975) (stat­
ing that the Court's seemingly arbitrary restriction on lawsuits under § lO(b) of the Ex­
change Act by plaintiffs who did not buy or sell the securities in question is "attenuated to 
the extent that remedies are available to nonpurchasers and nonsellers under state law"). 
70. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 57; Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: 
Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Cmises of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 302-14 
( 1998) (reciting statistics showing an increase in state court filings after the PSLRA); see also 
144 CONG. REC. S4781 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (floor debate on. S. 1260) (statement of Sen. 
Alfonse D'Amato) ("The problem to which I refer is .a loophole that strike lawyers have 
found in the 1995 [Reform Act) . . . .  "). 
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under the 1995 Act.71 Congress could have enacted legislation nar­
rowly targeting actual abuses (for example, allowing a federal court to 
stay discovery in state proceedings), but instead used the sledge 
hammer of preemption, forcing almost all class actions involving 
misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of nation­
ally traded securities into federal court.72 It did not matter that there 
were only thirty-nine state class action suits in 1997,73 and that three­
quarters of these were brought by California investors in California 
courts against California defendants (many in the Silicon Valley).74 It 
did not matter that this "problem," if there was one, may have been 
more appropriately resolved in Sacramento than in Washington, and 
that many of the politicians supporting preemption were generally 
states' rights advocates. What mattered was that Silicon Valley wanted 
this legislation and wanted it badly.75 While plaintiffs' lawyers put up a 
fight, they were not fighting for something that was particularly impor­
tant to them, because there was so little state-court litigation to begin 
with. The bill quickly won broad bipartisan support in Congress,76 and 
this time the signature of the President. 
Once again, the Commission put up a half-hearted fight to 
preserve private rights of action.77 Levitt (who does not mention this 
controversy in his book) was up for reconfirmation at the time, putting 
him in a difficult position. Congressional opponents of preemption 
also were perceived to be in the pocket of plaintiffs' lawyers, 
strengthening arguments that reform was needed because lawyers 
were profiting at the expense of issuers and investors. 
71. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 57, at 337 (discussing studies showing that state 
court actions were filed primarily to evade the 1995 Act's stay of discovery and its higher 
pleading standards). 
72. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1 998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 
Stat. 3227 (amending I S  U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb). 
73. See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State 
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 102 (1998) (hereinafter Painter, 
Responding to a False Alarm] (citing statistics prepared by Price Waterhouse). 
74. See id. at 36 n.183 (citing Commission staff report that reviewed fifty-five complaints 
filed in securities class actions under state law since passage of the 1995 Act and found that 
forty-three of these cases (78 % ) had been filed in California). 
75. See id. at S (discussing political contributions and lobbying power of Silicon Valley 
issuers and venture capitalists). 
76. See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1998). The Senate passed S. 
1260 by a vote of 79 to 21 on May 1 3, 1 998, and the House passed H.R. 1689, as amended to 
conform to S. 1260, by a vote of 340 to 83 on July 22, 1 998. See 144 CONG. REC. H6119-20 
(daily ed. July 22, 1998). 
77. See Painter, Responding to a False Alarm, supra note 73, at 53-54 (describing initial 
Commission opposition to the Uniform Standards Act followed by endorsement of the Act 
in return for minor adjustments to the Act and Senate floor discussion intended to create 
retroactive legislative history clarifying the 1995 Act's treatment of the scienter standard for 
suits under§ lO(b) of the Exchange Act). 
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Ironically, the 1995 and 1998 Acts have not harmed the plaintiffs' 
lawyers who led the fight against them. The market share of the most 
prominent plaintiffs' firm increased substantially after 1995, probably 
because the new legal rules raised barriers to entry into securities 
plaintiffs' litigation.78 Securities fraud suits have also been filed in 
record numbers after the 1995 Act.79 Lawyers thus still thrive in the 
securities class action litigation system. It is more debatable, however, 
whether civil litigation remains as powerful a deterrent to fraud as it 
once was. 
TAKING ON CONGRESS 
The most consequential "pay to play" game in the 1990s was that 
of the special interests frustrating Levitt's regulatory agenda. Cam­
paign contributions by all sides - accountants, high-technology firms, 
the financial services industry and the plaintiffs' bar - meant that the 
Commission, if it sought to infringe on special interests, always had to 
fear that it would be overruled by Congress. 
The most powerful theme in Levitt's book is his struggle with a 
political system that gave regulated industries extraordinary influence 
in Congress. The Commission's independence was undermined by its 
constant need to go to Congress for funding, the threat of Congress 
preempting the Commission's rulemaking function, and Levitt's own 
quest for a second term, which required Senate confirmation. The 
Commission was hardly an "independent" agency, immune from 
pressure from either political branch of government. 
The White House could have been a useful counterweight to the 
Congressional pressure described by Levitt, but it usually was not. The 
President did at least once tell Levitt's congressional critics to back 
off,80 but with little effect. Before Enron, Worldcom, and similar 
scandals broke in 2002, the relatively few battles that "pro-investor" 
politicians waged were over class action litigation, which concerned 
the interests of plaintiffs' lawyers as much as investors themselves. 
This hypocrisy was not lost on defendant groups who alleged that 
anyone who stood in their way was in the pocket of plaintiffs' lawyers. 
78. DONNA NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 434 (2003) (citing statistical evidence showing that a single law firm, Milberg 
Weiss, increased its share of securities class actions filed from 31 % before the 1995 Act to 
59% after the Act). 
79. Id. at 428-29 (citing statistics from Stanford/Cornerstone Research showing 188 se­
curities class actions filed in federal court in 1995, 109 in 1996, 174 in 1997, 233 in 1998, and 
then 259 in 2002). 
80. See p. 306 (reprinting a September 29, 2000 letter from Senator Tom Daschle to 
the President objecting to legislative initiatives to curb SEC oversight of the accounting 
industry). "The White House later issued a statement saying that it strongly opposed 
Congressional interference with the SEC's rulemaking." P. 306. 
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Direct public appeal to investor protection as a goal in itself was not a 
political priority. 
For Levitt to point out the degree that the political process had 
been corrupted might have cost him his reappointment in 1998, and he 
did not do so (even Levitt's book lacks an Appendix B listing the 
campaign contributions that accounting firms made to the authors of 
the letters included in Appendix A). On the other hand, a vigorous 
challenge to the role of campaign contributions in shaping securities 
laws might have forced Levitt's critics in Congress to back down. They 
might have retreated if Levitt had publicly explained why he believed 
they were behaving the way they were. 
Reform of the campaign-finance system, to the extent constitu­
tionally permitted,81 is one remedy for the regulatory capture strate­
gies that frustrated Levitt. Other less controversial measures, however, 
could also guard the Commission from capture through Congressional 
interference. First, the Commission's budget should be fixed over a 
long period of time (with periodic increases tied to inflation and the 
level of enforcement activity). Commission staff members' pay thus 
would not depend upon the whim of legislators who may be displeased 
at enforcement or rulemaking decisions.82 Second, the Chairman 
should perhaps be limited to a single, but longer, term to prevent 
reconfirmation from being implicitly conditioned on appeasement of 
special interests in Congress. Finally, the Commission should make 
public (perhaps on its web-site) all communications it receives from 
Members of Congress or their staff concerning rule making and 
enforcement activities. If the letters published in Appendix A to 
Levitt's book had been available to newspapers at the time they were 
written, such disclosure might have facilitated Levitt's case against 
congressional interference. 
CONCLUSION 
Levitt's book omits some important issues. It virtually ignores the 
debate over Congress's weakening of civil litigation as a deterrent for 
securities fraud in the 1990s. It also does not refute the possibility 
that the Commission spent political capital on some issues, such as 
Regulation FD, that were tangential to the core problems in the 1990s: 
misinformation, investor overoptimism, and overvaluation in the stock 
market.83 Levitt also owes his readers a better explanation of why 
important gatekeepers, such as analysts and lawyers, were not pursued 
81 .  See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 123 S. Ct. 2071 (2003). 
82. Federal judges for example, are constitutionally protected with lifetime tenure and 
no reduction in salary. Commissioners and their staff, by contrast, have relatively little pro­
tection and commensurately less independence from Congress. 
83. See generally ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000). 
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by the Commission with the same vigor that was devoted, with mixed 
results, to accountants. 
Levitt's practical advice for investors is helpful. He does not, 
however, adequately explain why small investors should invest in indi­
vidual stocks at all, rather than in diversified funds whose managers 
can overcome at least some disadvantages the market imposes on 
unsophisticated investors.84 Even if all of Levitt's recommendations for 
reform were implemented and all investors followed his advice, level­
ing the playing field between individual investors and sophisticated 
market participants may still be a losing proposition. To the extent this 
book encourages individual investors to engage in stock picking, in 
effect to try to outguess the market, Levitt's advice may not be 
sound.85 
Nonetheless, this book is an exceptionally interesting account of 
Levitt's fight against special interests that sought to derail his agenda 
as Chairman of the Commission. Levitt tells investors how severe their 
collective-action problems are in a political system in which everybody 
else can coordinate. He powerfully indicts a political system in which 
he stood virtually alone as a voice for the investing public. Voters, as 
well as investors, would profit from listening to what he has to say. 
84. Levitt does, however, discuss the perils of investing in poorly managed mutual funds, 
or funds with excessive or undisclosed fees. See pp. 41-64 (Chapter Two, "The Seven Deadly 
Sins of Mutual Funds"). Nonetheless, he did not foresee the seriousness of the conduct -
illegal late trading and market timing transactions that while legal should be disclosed -
that would scandalize the mutual fund industry in 2003. See Stephen Laba ton, S. E. C. 's Over­
sight of Mutual Funds Is Said to Be Lax, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, at Al. ("I believe this is 
the worst scandal we've seen in 50 years, and I can't say I saw it coming" (quoting Arthur 
Levitt (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
85. One study examined 1 10,000 individual accounts at a national discount brokerage 
firm and found that between 1990 and 1996, 20% of investors who bought at least 25 stocks 
demonstrated stock picking ability by choosing stocks that on average performed signifi­
cantly better than market averages (adjusted for the risk level in the investment). These in­
vestors picked stocks that on average gained 44% per year compared with 14.5% for the 
Wilshire 5000 index. Seventy percent of the investors, however, did worse than the market 
averages when transaction costs were included. See JOSHUA D. COVAL ET AL., CAN 
INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS BEAT THE MARKET? (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, 
Organizations, and Markets Unit, Working Paper 02-45, 2002), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=364000. 
